Abstract. We wish to model common-sense reasoning in situations where it contains some of the ingredients typical of proto-scientific reasoning, with a view to future elaboration and proof of concept. To model this proto-scientific narrative, we employ the integrative formal computational machinery we have been developing and implementing for rational cooperative epistemic agents. In our logic-based framework, agents can update their own and each other's theories, which are comprised of knowledge, active rules, integrity constraints, goals, abducibles, and preferences; they can engage in abductive reasoning involving updatable preferences; set each other goals; react to circumstances; plan and carry out actions; and revise their theories and preferences by means of concurrent updates on self and others.
Framework

Language
It is convenient to syntactically represent the theories of agents as propositional Horn theories. In particular, we represent default negation not A as a standard propositional variable. Propositional variables whose names do not begin with "not" and do not contain the symbols ":", "÷" and "<" are called domain atoms.
For each domain atom A we assume a complementary propositional variable of the form not A. Domain atoms and negated domain atoms are called domain literals.
Communication is a form of interaction among agents. The aim of an agent β when communicating a message C to an agent α, is to make α update its current theory with C (i.e., to make α accept some desired for mental state by β). In turn, when α receives the message C from β, it is up to α whether or not incorporate C. This form of communication is formalized through the notion of projects and updates. Propositional variables of the form α:C (where C is defined below) are called projects. α:C denotes the intention (of some agent β) of proposing the updating of the theory of agent α with C. Projects can be negated. A negated project of the form not α:C denotes the intention of the agent of not proposing the updating of the theory of agent α with C. Projects and negated projects are generically called project literals.
Propositional variables of the form β ÷C are called updates. β ÷C denotes an update with C in the current theory (of some agent α), that has been proposed by β. Updates can be negated. A negated update of the form not β÷C in the theory of some agent α indicates that agent β does not have the intention to update the theory of agent α with C. Updates and negated updates are called update literals.
Preference information is used along with incomplete knowledge. In such a setting, due to the incompleteness of the knowledge, several models of a program may be possible. Preference reasoning is enacted by choosing among those possible models, through the expression of priorities amongst the rules of the program. Preference information is formalized through the notion of priority atoms. Propositional variables of the form n r < n u are called priority atoms. n r < n u means that rule r (whose name is n r ) is preferred to rule u (whose name is n u ). Priority atoms can be negated. not n r < n u means that rule r is not preferred to rule u. Priority atoms and negated priority atoms are called priority literals.
Domain atoms, projects, updates and priority atoms are generically called atoms. Domain literals, project literals, update literals and priority literals are generically called literals. Integrity constraints are rules that enforce some condition on states, and they take the form of denials. To make integrity constraints updatable, we allow the domain literal not false to occur in the head of an integrity constraint. For example, updating the theory of an agent α with not false ← relaxConstraints has the effect to turn off the integrity constraints of α if relaxConstraints holds. Note that the body of an integrity constraint can contain any literal. The following definition introduces rules that are executed bottom-up. To emphasize this aspect we employ a different notation for them. of the active rule is satisfied, then the project (fluent) Z can be selected and executed. The head of an active rule is a project, either internal or external. An internal project operates on the state of the agent itself (self-update), e.g., if an agent gets an observation, then it updates its knowledge. External projects instead are performed on other agents, e.g., when an agent wants to update the theory of another agent.
Definition 4. An active rule is a generalized rule whose head Z is a project literal and every literal
To express preference information in logic programs we introduce the notion of priority rule. Priority rules are also subject to updating.
We assume that for every project α:C, C is either a domain rule, an integrity constraint, an active rule, a priority rule or a query. Thus, a project can take one of the forms:
Let A be a set of domain literals distinct from false. We call the domain literals in A abducibles. Abducibles can be thought of as hypotheses that can be used to extend the current theory of the agent in order to provide an "explanation" for given queries. Explanations are required to meet all the integrity constraints. Abducibles may also be defined by domain rules as the result of a self-update which adopts an abducible as a rule.
The reader can refer to [7, 8] for the declarative and procedural semantics of our framework of abductive logic-based agents, to [5] for a logic-based agent architecture, to [1] for a proof procedure of updating plus preferring reasoning, and to [6] for an asynchronous multi-agent system in which the interaction among agents is characterized by a transition rule system. N.B.: In the sequel, rules with variables stand for the set of all their ground instances with respect to the Herbrand universe of the program.
Abductive Agents
The knowledge of an agent can dynamically evolve when the agent receives new knowledge, albeit by self-updating rules, or when it abduces new hypotheses to explain observations. The new knowledge is represented in the form of an updating program, and the new hypotheses in the form of a finite set of abducibles. An updating program contains the updates that will be performed on the current knowledge state of the agent. To characterize the evolution of the knowledge of an agent we need to introduce the notion of sequence of updating programs. In the remaining, let S = {1, . . . , s, . . .} be a set of natural numbers. We call the elements i ∈ S ∪ {0} states. 
Abductive stable models
In the remainder of the paper, by (2-valued) interpretation M we mean any consistent 1 set of literals. Given a generalized rule r of the form
Definition 9. Let P be a set of generalized rules and M an interpretation. The set of default assumptions is:
The knowledge of an agent α is characterized at the start (at state 0) by the set of all default assumptions not A (that is, by Default({}, M )). Its knowledge can dynamically evolve when α receives new knowledge, via a sequence of updating programs U = {U 1 , . . . , U s }. Intuitively, the evolution of knowledge may be viewed as the result of, starting with the set of all default assumptions, updating it with U 1 , updating next with U 2 , and so on. The role of updating is to ensure that the rules contained in these newly added updates are in force, and that previous rules are still valid (by inertia) as far as possible, i.e., they are in force. This rationale is at the basis of the notion of rejected rules, spelled out below.
A rule r proposed via an update in U i by an agent β is rejected at state s by an interpretation M if there exists a rule r proposed via a subsequent update in U j by an agent α, such that the head of r is the complement of the head of r, the body of r is true in M and the update is not distrusted. 
The idea behind the updating process is that newer rules reject older ones in such a way that contradictions can never arise between them. Thus, contradictions could only ever arise between rules introduced at the same state. Furthermore, an agent α can prevent any type of updates from an agent β via the use of distrust in the theory of α, e.g., distrust(β÷C) ← liar(β).
As the head of an active rule is a project (and not a domain atom), active rules can only be rejected by active rules. Rejecting an active rule r makes r not triggerable even if its body is true in the model. Thus, by rejecting active rules, we make the agent less reactive.
Let Ψ s α = (A, U) be an agent α at state s and La ⊆ A a set of abducibles. We write U + La to indicate the sequence of updating programs U ∪ {U s+1 }, where 
, where:
Note that the abducibles are treated as a virtual update. That is, to compute the abductive stable models the abducibles abduced by α at state s are treated as if they were internal updates of α at state s + 1. The virtual update is only used to compute the abductive stable models, and there is no commitment to what α will receive as update at the next state s + 1.
Preferred abductive stable models
While updates allow us to deal with a dynamically evolving world, where rules change in time, preferences allow us to choose among various possible models of the world and among possible incompatible reactions. In [2] , two criteria are established to remove unpreferred generalized rules in a program: removing unsupported generalized rules, and removing less preferred generalized rules defeated by the head of some more preferred one. Unsupported generalized rules are rules whose head is true in the model and whose body is defeated by the model. Below we write body + (r) (resp. body − (r)) to indicate the atoms (resp. the negated atoms) in the body of a rule r.
Definition 12. Let P be a set of generalized rules and M an interpretation. The set of unsupported generalized rules of P and M is:
Unpref (P, M ) is a set of unpreferred generalized rules of P and M iff:
In other words, a generalized rule is unpreferred if it is unsupported or defeated by a more preferred generalized rule (which is not itself unpreferred), or if it attacks (i.e., attempts to defeat) a more preferred generalized rule. 
T is the set containing all the rules in updates that are trusted from α according to M , and R is the set of all the rules that are rejected at state s. X is the set of all the trusted rules that are neither rejected nor unpreferred. Note that at state s an agent α may have several abductive explanations for a query Q.
Agent Cycle
Every agent α can be thought of as a pair Ψ α = (A, U), where A is a set of abducibles and U is a sequence of updating programs, equipped with a set of inputs represented as updates. The abducibles are used as explanations for proving the goals of the agent, and updates can be used to solve the goals as well as to trigger new goals. The basic "engine" of an agent α is an abductive logic programming proof procedure, executed via the cycle represented in Fig. 1 . Step 1: The cycle of an agent α starts at state s by observing any inputs (updates from other agents) from the environment, and by recording them in the updating program U s .
Step 2:
where
Note that only the goals issued by the agent α itself are executed. The goals issued by other agents are treated as normal updates 2 . Then, g is executed. Here, we can use any abductive proof procedure, such as ABDUAL [3, 4] .
Step 3: The executable projects are executed. The set ExecProj of executable projects of an agent depends on the kind of agent we want to model. For instance, in case of a cautious agent, the set of executable projects is: ExecProj (La) = { β:C | for every preferred abductive stable model M at state s with hypotheses La, it holds that β:C ∈ M }.
If an executable project takes the form β : C (meaning that agent α intends to update the theory of agent β with C at state s), then (once executed) the update α ÷ C will be available as input to the cycle of the agent β.
Step 4: Finally, the agent cycles by increasing the state, by incorporating the updating program U s into U, and with the new list G of goals.
Initially, the cycle of α is Cycle(α,1,Ψ 0 α ,{}) with Ψ 0 α = (A, {}).
Sequential execution of actions
To express the sequential execution of actions we introduce the notion of sequence of abducibles.
Definition 15. Let A be a set of abducibles. Then, a sequence of abducibles is inductively defined as follow:
every a ∈ A is a sequence of abducibles; 2. if a ∈ A and x is a sequence of abducibles, then a x is a sequence of abducibles; 3. nothing else is a sequence of abducibles.
Intuitively, a sequence a b c of abducibles states to abduce first a, then b and finally c. This capability allows an agent to execute actions in sequence. For instance, if the abducibles a, b and c occur in three distinct active rules r a , r b and r c , then the sequence a b c permits executing the projects occurring in the heads of r a , r b and r c sequentially.
Consider an agent α that has a plan p consisting of two actions, a followed by b. Suppose that p is executable if some condition cond holds. Let A = {a, b} be a set of abducibles. Such a plan can be expressed as:
where precX and effectX indicate the precondition and the effect of an action X. By launching the execution of p, if cond holds then the sequence a b of abducibles is executed. First, a is abduced and if precA holds the action A can be executed. The effects of executing A are expressed via the project α : effectA. If instead precA does not hold, then the plan p cannot be accomplished. Once the execution of A is terminated, b is abduced and the action B executed.
Such a plan can be coded in our framework as:
with the new set of abducibles B = {start(p), stop(p), a, b, ta, tb, tp}. Launching the plan p, by means of the rule (1), has the effect of abducing start(p), which in turn will trigger the active rules (2) and (3). The active rule (2) updates the theory of the agent α with exec(p) to indicate that α is executing the plan p. The active rule (3), by launching the query ?−a has the effect of making the agent α abduce a at the next agent cycle. The active rules (5) and (6) model the sequencing of the actions a and b. If precA holds, abducing a while proving the plan p will trigger the active rules (7) and (8) . The effect of triggering them is that the project α : effectA will be executed and the goal ?−ta launched at the next agent cycle. As ta is an abducible, at the next cycle ta will be abduced. This indicates that the action a is terminated. The action b can then be executed. This is achieved by triggering the active rule (5) that will launch the goal ?−b.
At the next cycle b will be abduced and if precB holds the active rules (9) and (10) will be triggered. The project α : effectB will be executed and the goal ?−tb launched. Abducing tb indicates that the action b is terminated and therefore the entire plan p has been accomplished (i.e., the active rule (10) is triggered).
Recall that abductions adopted at one state do not carry over to the next state. Nevertheless, that can be achieved if desired, either by update imposing the abduced literals as facts, or else by enforcing their abduction anew, via the updating of an abduction goal to that effect into the next state.
Modelling Proto-scientific Reasoning by Rational Agents
Next we illustrate how to model, with the above instruments, common-sense reasoning in situations where it contains some of the ingredients typical of protoscientific reasoning, with a view to future elaboration, proof of concept, and extension of the approach to scientific reasoning itself. To do so, we construe an exemplificative narrative of a doctor/patient cooperative diagnostic situation development, involving a combination of a number of common rational abilities illustrative of proto-scientific reasoning and acting, which demand their joint exercise, both in an individual and a cooperative fashion, akin to scientific theory refinement. To model this proto-scientific narrative, we employ the integrative formal computational machinery we have been developing and implementing for rational cooperative epistemic agents, and recapitulated above. Indeed, in our logic-based framework, agents can update their own and each other's theories, which are comprised of knowledge, active rules, integrity constraints, goals, abducibles, and preferences; they can engage in abductive reasoning involving updatable preferences; set each other goals; react to circumstances; plan and carry out actions; and revise their theories and preferences by means of concurrent updates on self and others. The narrative below involves an initial patient situation requiring causal explanation; plus his interactive recourse to a doctor, whose initial therapeutic theory, diagnoses, and diagnostic preferences, are conducive to his advising the patient; and furthermore, initiative is required by the patient about courses of action to obtain prescribed medicine, and experimentation and observation of its effect; but meanwhile, unforeseen circumstances provide unexpected new information and action from a third agent, become pertinent for the problem at hand; as a result, the doctor's original theory is revised, in what regards his diagnostic preferences, in the light of the patient's experimentation, and the unexpected triggering of an unforeseen action by the third party. The example has been fully tested with our implementation. 
Requiring causal explanation
Since the theory of John does not contain any priority rules, the preferred stable model of John at the current state is equivalent to the abductive stable model M 1 = {work, likeWork, sProblems, badHabits, longTimeBadHabits, doctor : sProblems, doctor : ?−askReason(sProblems)}. According to the definition of agent cycle, John will execute the two projects in M 1 (step 3), and then he will cycle (step 4). When the doctor will observe his inputs (step 1), he will receive the two updates:
Any time the doctor is asked a reason for a medical problem by a patient, the doctor must make a diagnosis. To do so, he must first collect the relevant information about the medical problem from the patient, then diagnose the cause of the problem and tells it to the patient together with the suggested treatment. 
Since the doctor does not have any goal to execute at step 2, he starts executing his projects (step 3). At this step, the unique project in his preferred abductive stable model is doctor : ?−diagnosis(john, X, sProblems). Thus, at the next cycle of the doctor, the plan to make a diagnosis will start (step 2) by collecting all the information relevant for the sleeping problems. This will make the doctor to ask John the following questions john : ?−work, john : ?−likeWork, john : ?−badHabits and john : ?−longTimeBadHabits.
After the replies of John (recall that John answers every question of the doctor), the theory of the doctor will be updated with: john÷work john÷likeWork john÷badHabits john÷longTimeBadHabits After having executed the first action of the diagnosis plan, the doctor must find out a cause and the corresponding treatment of the problem, and tell them to John.
The cause(P, insomnia, sProblems) < cause(P, stress, sProblems) ← pStress(P ) cause(P, stress, sProblems) < cause(P, insomnia, sProblems) ← stress(P ), not pStress(P ) pStress(P ) ← stress(P ), P ÷likeWork stress(P ) ← P ÷work false ← cause(P, badHabits, sProblems), P ÷longTimeBadHabits Being pStress(john) true in the theory of the doctor, the doctor prefers the abductive explanation cause(john, insomnia, sProblems) to the abductive explanation cause(john, stress, sProblems). Since it does not satisfy the integrity constraints, the abductive explanation cause(john, badHabits, sProblems) is excluded by the doctor.
As 
takePills, not havePills ⇒ john : ?−getPills goToPharmacy ⇒ john : ?−goTo(X) buyPills ⇒ john : havePills Since John must take the sleeping pills and he does not have them, by triggering the first active rule above, the internal project john : ?−getPills is executed. This has the effect of launching the plan to get to a pharmacy and to buy the pills.
The theory of John contains a priority rule stating to prefer r 1 to r 2 if the pharmacy f 1 is near. As f 1 is not open, it cannot be chosen (i.e., the body of r 1 is false). In fact, the rule r 2 does not belong to the set of unpreferred rules (see Def. 12) since body Note that the internal project john : ?−stop(getPills) has the effect of making John abduce stop(getPills). Thus, John will stop the execution of the plan and he will relaunch his goal to get to a pharmacy. Now, since f 1 is open, the rule r 1 is preferrable to the rule r 2 . Thereby, John will go to the nearby pharmacy.
Note also that here we have encoded plans directly in the agents knowledge. In general, one can employ a planner that given a task produces sequences of actions to be executed. We have shown only actions performed in sequence, but other types of actions can be expressed in our framework as well, like parallel actions and sensing actions. The doctor updates his priority rules via the two active rules above in such a way to suggest a different treatment to other patients with insomnia problems.
Patient's experimentation
Conclusion
We believe to have shown that the application of proto-scientific reasoning in common-sense examples, modelled by collections of rational agents, is an avenue of research worth pursuing with a view to further the modelling of collaborative scientific theory development and refinement. Three worthwhile aspects we did not touch upon, but which are already well within reach of present formal machinery are rule induction, argumentation, and mutual debugging.
